You may find by now that Book 4 is significantly different from the narratives of the previous three books. Thucydides focuses more closely on three main arenas that were previously introduced in our earlier readings. It is an exciting book which gives us a taste of what Thucydides can do with his writing style which Books 6 & 7 will show in Sicily. Please look over our study guide questions below as you read through Books 4 and the opening chapters of Book 5 (chs. 1-26). I have made use of W. Robert Connor’s book Thucydides to help inspire discussion of this turning point in the “Archidamean War”. We will discuss the reading and these questions in our next conference call on Monday March 9. As always, let me know if any of these questions grab you enough to lead off a discussion on our next call. Enjoy!
-“festina lente” (hurry slowly)
Thucydides Book 4.1– 5.26
Three main efforts, a pivotally symbolic triptych
1. Pylos –
Comment: The narration of this event is a marked change of Thucydides’ style compared to previously related campaigns. W. Robert Connor in his assessment Thucydides (Princeton UP, 1985) writes: “Paradox has an important role in the account, and a fully appropriate one. The Pylos operation marks a major turning point in the Histories. It is the first sign of the grand reversal in which the war culminates – the Athenians, at the outset Greece’s major naval power, ultimately lose their fleet; the Spartans, traditionally a land power, acquire an empire and develop the navy to control it. Pylos is our first glimpse of the larger pattern” (Connor, 111).
Questions: What do you think of Connor’s assessment? The description of the Pylos campaign takes up a good portion of the first half of Book 4. Why has Thucydides focused more on the telling of the battle and not as much on the negotiations and politics around the battle?Why do the “rational” Athenians reject an offer of peace from the Spartans?Why do the “belligerent” Spartans offer such rational peace terms?
2. Hermocrates’ speech at Gela – an attempt at unifying ‘Sicilians’ against the influence of the Athenians.
Comment: Hermocrates’ logic is a recognition that aggressive “preventative measures” are the best form of defense in the RealPolitik world of the Greek Mediterranean. W. R. Connor argues that this speech may hearken back to Thucydides’ earlier statement on the cause of the Peloponnesian War in the first place. Thucydides’ original words are: “The truest reason, although the least evident in the discussion, was, in my opinion, that the Athenians by growing great caused fear in the Lacedaemonians and drove them into war” (1.23.6). This may be the repetition of a key theme for Thucydides about the ‘balance of power’ situation in the Mediterranean.
Questions: Once again, as with the Spartan delegation to Athens earlier in Book 4, Hermocrates’ speech is not balanced with an “antilogy” or counterpart speech as we saw Thucydides do earlier in Books 1-3. Why do you suppose Thucydides presents this speech by itself?Is he commenting on the lack of debate among people & governments? Is it a comment on the state of war at this time?Have the ‘courtesies of war’ slowly been dispensed with after so many years of destruction?
3. Brasidas’ operations in Northern Greece –
Comment: Sparta sends out a military commander with some diplomatic skills. The interesting characteristics of Brasidas are not only his ability to combine military effectiveness with politics in the Northern Greek regions, but his ability to promote the mantra of Sparta’s willingness to ‘liberate Greeks from Athenian imperialism.’ In addition, examples of Brasidas’ clemency show a ‘kinder, gentler’ version of one’s typical image of a Spartan, which helps to promote Sparta’s image. Meanwhile, “liberated city-states” continue to install pro-Spartan oligarchies in various cities won over by Brasidas’ charisma. The contrast between Brasidas and Cleon from earlier in Book 4 is inevitable: Cleon the politician-turned-commander meets Brasidas the commander-turned-diplomat at Amphipolis. Both are killed as a result of the battle, but both have made their mark on the war. Neither of them was favorable towards a peace settlement, but with both out of the way, Book 5 opens with a temporary peace that, alas, will not last. The pawns in their game, the city-states of the North, find themselves desperate to ally with a winner who can end this war. Unfortunately, the war’s changing fortunes only lead to reprisals from Athens and more bloodshed.
Questions: What about the ideal of Greek city-state independence? Can it ever exist again? Did it really ever exist prior to this?Which side, Sparta or Athens, are the real “liberators” (if any)?What part did Thucydides himself play in the battle of Amphipolis? Why did he suffer banishment as a result? Could these personal reversals affect his telling of the History? Why does Thucydides focus so much on the personalities of Cleon and Brasidas? Does this method adequately signify larger political and social trends for each of the superpowers? Does this method forecast events for the rest of the war and the post-bellum period for Greece?